That Chávez Thing Is Over
By Ruchir Sharma
From Newsweek
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez is the new rock star of world politics. His impassioned rants against globalization, with animated poses to match, make front-page headlines almost daily. The commentariat—particularly in Europe—seems to buy Chávez’s line that Latin Americans are so disenchanted by their short tryst with liberalism that they now prefer a strongman to spread the benefits of a commodity boom. The recent moves by a Chávez soulmate, Evo Morales, to renationalize the energy resources of Bolivia reinforce a growing perception that Latin America is lurching to the radical left.
But it’s not. While Chávez does seem to rekindle a certain romantic Western nostalgia for Latin American guerrilla movements, the underlying trends point in the opposite direction. Voters in Latin America, far from crying out for a radically new economic model inspired by Caracas, are in fact rallying powerfully behind leaders and parties who promote more-orthodox economic policies. As candidates espousing Chávez-style populism have plummeted in the polls in Mexico and Peru, their camps have tried to distance themselves from the Venezuelan leader. Elsewhere, incumbent presidents like Alvaro Uribe in Colombia and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil have won plaudits as economic managers, and look likely to be reelected.
This is good news for Latin America. It shows that political societies have evolved to the point where most people realize that, in a globalized world, they have to stick to a reformist path. Consider the maturation of Peruvian front-runner Alan García, who in his first stint as president let government spending run out of control, launched a disastrous attempt to nationalize the banking sector and left office in 1990 with the economy in crisis. He has promised to promote foreign investment, free trade and macroeconomic stability if re-elected. That has inspired Chávez to hurl invectives at García in an effort to help his left-wing challenger, Ollanta Humala. But Peruvian voters are unimpressed; García recently moved into a decisive lead in the polls. In Mexico, ruling-party candidate Felipe Calderón’s team has pressed the claim that if leftist Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel López Obrador is elected, he would undermine the country’s economic stability by following Chávez’s “irresponsible” playbook. Calderón, too, has unexpectedly surged in the polls.
The same basic story line is playing out in Colombia, where a firmly right-of-center leader is cruising toward re-election on May 28. President Uribe is getting credit for engineering an economic revival, powered by domestic demand, and improving the investment climate by cracking down hard on drug cartels. He has helped cut the government deficit from 6 percent of GDP in the late ’90s to 1.4 percent and is promising to rationalize the tax structure if he wins a second term. Brazil’s Lula has followed a different ideological trajectory, moving from champion of labor to advocate of fiscal responsibility, but the result will likely be the same when voters go to the polls later this year: a second term for a mainstream candidate.
The power of incumbents is not particularly surprising, since Latin America is enjoying one of its best economic phases ever. Economic growth is likely to average 4.5 to 5 percent this year, spurred by the region’s biggest export: commodities. Latin American equity markets have been among the world’s top performers over the past three years, rising by 275 percent on average in dollar terms. Inflation in most countries has fallen to single-digit levels and the region is now running a current account balance.
That’s the big picture. But with Chávez grabbing headlines, the exceptional case of Bolivia—where economic growth was badly managed by Morales’s predecessors—has become central. Brazil’s $800 billion economy is the largest in Latin America, 80 times larger than Bolivia’s, and its stability is far more typical of the region. Yet Bolivia is now widely discussed as the important bellwether. Go figure.
Chávez’s ambition to become a dominant regional figure in the image of his idol, Simón Bolívar, is legendary. His role in Bolivia’s turn to the left—and in the Mexico and Peru elections—all play into this self-image. But if his foes in those elections triumph, the result will be read in part as a referendum on Chávez. He will be pushed to the fringe, marginalized. Much to the disappointment of the romantics, the Chávez road will have led nowhere.
And Latin America will be better off for it. Despite its recent economic successes, the region is still falling behind Eastern Europe and Asia, and needs to aim for even faster growth. Its economies must become less dependent on natural resources in order to raise per capita incomes and address sharp income inequality. All that is more likely to be achieved by strengthening domestic institutions and carrying out microeconomic reform than by selling people a new utopian dream.



Ruchir Sharma is engaged in wishful thinking–he wants to see a rejection of Chavista thinking from a few minor swings in the polls. But he also tries to draw a huge line of distinction between “reformists” and “revolutionaries”. The funny thing is that the “reformists” seem to have a lot of sympathy with the “revolutionaries” and not opposed to their positions. Lula in Brazil and Kirchner in Argentina have been very happy to stand with Chavez on certain key issues, especially the FTAA (ALCA). Governments all around Latin America have proven eager to sign trade deals with Venezuela to get cheap oil. Maybe Alan Garcia will beat Ollanta Humala in Peru, but voting for Garcia is hardly a rejection the reforms of Chavez and Morales. Whether Peruvians select Humala or Garcia, they are voting against neoliberalism, and want to be much tougher on multinational corporations operating in their country. I don’t think Garcia has rejected nationalization and he certainly hasn’t rejected greater redistribution of income. The next time that there is a meeting of the OAS, the Peruvian delegation is morely likely to be standing next to a block lead by Chavez, than a block led by the US. Sharma mentions the poor growth rates of Latin America, but he doesn’t discuss one of the root causes of that stagnation which is the neoliberal economic model being promoted by the IMF. The “reformers” have overwhelmingly rejected it along with the “revolutionaries”.
Here is the reality of the situation: in Venezuela and Bolivia which are sitting on huge hydrocarbon reserves, nationalization and redistribution of profits is the best way to ensure a higher standard of living for the majority. In countries like Brazil, Peru, and Argentina which aren’t sitting on a natural resource to exploit in this way, there is less call for nationalization and greater redistribution of the profits of the transnational corporations. Instead, in Argentina and Brazil the greatest need is to get rid of IMF debt so that they can no longer be bullied into neoliberal structural readjustment–this is what Lula and Kirchner are trying to do. Whether it be nationalization, challenging IMF dictates or refusing to repay IMF loans, there is widespread rejection of the Washington Consensus and neoliberalism across Latin America. When Sharma concludes that the problems of income inequality and stagnating growth can be acheived by “strengthening domestic institutions and carrying out microeconimc reforms” he is misrepresenting the agenda of the “reformers” and blathering platitudes. I’m not sure which “domestic institutions” Sharma is refering to, but the elections of Kirchner, Lula, Morales, and Tabaré Vasquéz were all triumphs of domestic institutions–meaning the mobilization of NGOs and community-based groups. One of the most important elements about the Chavez government has been the effort to set up community-based organizations. The protests in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador which shut down roads and block the normal functioning of government and commerce are all based upon domestic institutions–just not the kind of domestic institutions that Sharma considers important. What Sharma means is domestic institutions which promote the interests of the wealthy, but he fails to see that those kinds of institutions are the cause of unrest, instability, and inequality. When Sharma blathers about “microeconomic reforms”, he misrepresents the position of the “reformers”, because they want much more than a few “microeconomic reforms”–breaking the hold of the IMF is the prerequisite to do any other more meaningful reform. Both Brazil and Argentinian want to retire the IMF debt so they are free to do more meaningful reforms without their economies being held ransom by foreign institutions.